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Gregor Macdonald

by Gregor Macdonald

Executive Summary

  • The criticality of innovating better storage solutions
  • The pros & cons of investing in energy inputs (coal, oil, etc.) or new energy technologies
  • The impact of increased carbon taxation & higher oil prices
  • Watch where global energy demand is shifting
  • The four ripe sigmoidal growth opportunities
  • Why coal remains the king of fuel

If you have not yet read The New Future of Energy Policy, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

As oil went through a price revolution starting in 2004, the venture capital community embraced an array of greentech start-ups. But the first wave of these, which centered on biofuels and other liquid-based replacements for oil, were destined to fail – and fail they did. It has apparently taken a period of digestion and reflection for investors, innovators, and venture capital to quantify better which areas are more promising in the new energy landscape.

Just recently, for example, investment vehicles controlled by Peter Thiel and Bill Gates were among those who funded energy storage company LightSail, which is exploring the use of compressed air as a method for energy storage. This is meaningful.

It indicates an awareness that not only is global energy demand switching over to the grid, but also, that the grid of the future will need much greater flexibility. So, yes, the grid is the future. But storage the ability to retain surplus electricity for release at a later time will be crucial. The reason is that the blend or mix now developing: coal, nuclear, natural gas, hydro, utility-grade wind, and solar (including residential solar) will present a challenge to the grid with its enormous variability in supply.

Storage, to use an economics term, allows for intertemporal supply: the ability to spread power over time. Whether or not LightSail’s technology works and is commercially scalable is a question that awaits an answer. But to target investment in this area, rather than in algae fuels, is right on the mark.

And the need for storage is already becoming critical. The “variability problem” is especially a concern…

Investing Strategies for the New Energy Era
PREVIEW by Gregor Macdonald

Executive Summary

  • The criticality of innovating better storage solutions
  • The pros & cons of investing in energy inputs (coal, oil, etc.) or new energy technologies
  • The impact of increased carbon taxation & higher oil prices
  • Watch where global energy demand is shifting
  • The four ripe sigmoidal growth opportunities
  • Why coal remains the king of fuel

If you have not yet read The New Future of Energy Policy, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

As oil went through a price revolution starting in 2004, the venture capital community embraced an array of greentech start-ups. But the first wave of these, which centered on biofuels and other liquid-based replacements for oil, were destined to fail – and fail they did. It has apparently taken a period of digestion and reflection for investors, innovators, and venture capital to quantify better which areas are more promising in the new energy landscape.

Just recently, for example, investment vehicles controlled by Peter Thiel and Bill Gates were among those who funded energy storage company LightSail, which is exploring the use of compressed air as a method for energy storage. This is meaningful.

It indicates an awareness that not only is global energy demand switching over to the grid, but also, that the grid of the future will need much greater flexibility. So, yes, the grid is the future. But storage the ability to retain surplus electricity for release at a later time will be crucial. The reason is that the blend or mix now developing: coal, nuclear, natural gas, hydro, utility-grade wind, and solar (including residential solar) will present a challenge to the grid with its enormous variability in supply.

Storage, to use an economics term, allows for intertemporal supply: the ability to spread power over time. Whether or not LightSail’s technology works and is commercially scalable is a question that awaits an answer. But to target investment in this area, rather than in algae fuels, is right on the mark.

And the need for storage is already becoming critical. The “variability problem” is especially a concern…

by Gregor Macdonald

Flood myths are common to human culture. Swollen rivers, tidal storms, and tsunamis make their appearance frequently in literature. But Hurricane Sandy, which has drawn newly etched high-water marks on the buildings of lower Manhattan (and Brooklyn), has shifted the discussion from storytelling to reality.

Volatility in climate has drawn the attention of policy makers for a decade. But as so often is the case, a dramatic event like superstorm Sandy – the largest storm to hit New York since the colonial era – has punctured the psyche of the densely populated East Coast, including the New York-Washington, DC axis where U.S. policy is made.

Not surprisingly, in the weeks since the historical hurricane made landfall, new attention is being paid to the mounting costs that coastal world megacities may face.

Intriguingly, however, this new conversation about climate, energy policy, and America’s reliance on fossil fuels comes after a five-year period in which the U.S. has dramatically lowered its consumption of oil and seen an equally dramatic upturn in the growth of renewable energy.

The New Future of Energy Policy
by Gregor Macdonald

Flood myths are common to human culture. Swollen rivers, tidal storms, and tsunamis make their appearance frequently in literature. But Hurricane Sandy, which has drawn newly etched high-water marks on the buildings of lower Manhattan (and Brooklyn), has shifted the discussion from storytelling to reality.

Volatility in climate has drawn the attention of policy makers for a decade. But as so often is the case, a dramatic event like superstorm Sandy – the largest storm to hit New York since the colonial era – has punctured the psyche of the densely populated East Coast, including the New York-Washington, DC axis where U.S. policy is made.

Not surprisingly, in the weeks since the historical hurricane made landfall, new attention is being paid to the mounting costs that coastal world megacities may face.

Intriguingly, however, this new conversation about climate, energy policy, and America’s reliance on fossil fuels comes after a five-year period in which the U.S. has dramatically lowered its consumption of oil and seen an equally dramatic upturn in the growth of renewable energy.

by Gregor Macdonald

Given emerging data in 2012, it's becoming increasingly clear that the post-war automobile era in the United States is now in well-articulated decline. Accordingly, it makes sense to note the beginning of a long-term supertrend that is just getting started: the resurrection of America’s rail system.

Getting on the Train
by Gregor Macdonald

Given emerging data in 2012, it's becoming increasingly clear that the post-war automobile era in the United States is now in well-articulated decline. Accordingly, it makes sense to note the beginning of a long-term supertrend that is just getting started: the resurrection of America’s rail system.

by Gregor Macdonald

Executive Summary

  • How to cut household exposure to oil prices
  • Spending is shifting from road to rail transport. You need to get out in front of this.
  • How to take advantage of the energy arbitrage that rail transport will offer in future years
  • Important case studies of what's to come
  • The big change ahead (and the argument for optimism)

If you have not yet read Part I: Getting On The Train, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

Portland, Oregon is a city well known internationally for its commitment to sustainability. Over the years, the downtown area has been wisely restored into a very pedestrian-friendly streetscape. And while Portland continues to have problems – mainly a weak economy that could benefit from greater diversification – the city continues to attract people from all over the world who are looking for a better place to ride out some of the problems now facing developed economies.

Over the past year, since moving to Portland myself, I've had a chance to do some accounting of how much I've reduced my own exposure to oil. Let me first say that getting oil out of the household budget was not my only reason for moving to Portland. However, as someone who started looking at these issues 10-15 years ago, the prospect of greatly reducing my oil consumption was a key factor in my decision to relocate.

Now, while it's true that reduced oil consumption is more common for everybody living here in Portland, the other important element (and this will seem obvious) is that living in other cities and regions typically means a greatly increased exposure to oil. So while the cost of food, medical care, and many goods is just as expensive here in Portland as elsewhere, it is now rather sobering to consider the burden of high oil prices in other regions from my new vantage point – especially given that oil has found a new equilibrium price around $100 a barrel.

By moving to Portland, we completely shifted the core of our energy consumption to natural gas and also electricity, which in the Pacific Northwest is largely sourced through hydropower. Electricity rates in the Pacific Northwest are either the lowest or among the lowest in the United States. Also, because of the rich offerings in public transportation choices, we were able to drop one of two cars. But there's more…

Reducing Your Exposure to Oil Prices
PREVIEW by Gregor Macdonald

Executive Summary

  • How to cut household exposure to oil prices
  • Spending is shifting from road to rail transport. You need to get out in front of this.
  • How to take advantage of the energy arbitrage that rail transport will offer in future years
  • Important case studies of what's to come
  • The big change ahead (and the argument for optimism)

If you have not yet read Part I: Getting On The Train, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

Portland, Oregon is a city well known internationally for its commitment to sustainability. Over the years, the downtown area has been wisely restored into a very pedestrian-friendly streetscape. And while Portland continues to have problems – mainly a weak economy that could benefit from greater diversification – the city continues to attract people from all over the world who are looking for a better place to ride out some of the problems now facing developed economies.

Over the past year, since moving to Portland myself, I've had a chance to do some accounting of how much I've reduced my own exposure to oil. Let me first say that getting oil out of the household budget was not my only reason for moving to Portland. However, as someone who started looking at these issues 10-15 years ago, the prospect of greatly reducing my oil consumption was a key factor in my decision to relocate.

Now, while it's true that reduced oil consumption is more common for everybody living here in Portland, the other important element (and this will seem obvious) is that living in other cities and regions typically means a greatly increased exposure to oil. So while the cost of food, medical care, and many goods is just as expensive here in Portland as elsewhere, it is now rather sobering to consider the burden of high oil prices in other regions from my new vantage point – especially given that oil has found a new equilibrium price around $100 a barrel.

By moving to Portland, we completely shifted the core of our energy consumption to natural gas and also electricity, which in the Pacific Northwest is largely sourced through hydropower. Electricity rates in the Pacific Northwest are either the lowest or among the lowest in the United States. Also, because of the rich offerings in public transportation choices, we were able to drop one of two cars. But there's more…

by Gregor Macdonald

Executive Summary

  • Why household balance sheets are worse off than advertised
  • Why the recent rosy BLS jobs numbers actually mean bad news
  • How the Fed is squeezing investor capital out of other traditional asset pools and into the stock market
  • Expect to see the stock market moving higher in 2013; that is, until QE3 fails
  • What to expect if QE3 fails sooner than anticipated

If you have not yet read Part I: The Future of Gold, Oil & the Dollar, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

Market historians have recently started to point out that the current advance in the S&P500 is now 40 months old and has made gains of over 115% since the March 2009 lows. In other words, the doubling from the lows in price and the duration of the advance now late in its third year together suggest that a cyclical top is near. Furthermore, despite some noise in U.S. macro data – which has been briefly more hopeful, yet remains well within the phase of stagnation – earnings estimates have been coming down as the world economy continues to shift into lower gear.

Perhaps for the first time in a while, we can actually say that the Fed's decision to start QE3 was moderately anticipatory, in contrast to its ad-hoc and reactive policymaking over the past five years. It is not merely that the Fed soberly accepted that the economy was not getting better. The stagnant, tractionless macro data over the past year has spoken quite loudly to that fact. Indeed, the U.S. economy is merely treading water, and the Fed's move to QE3 serves as a sharp retort to those who would relentlessly attempt to portray stagnation as recovery.

Where Stock Prices Are Headed Over the Next Year
PREVIEW by Gregor Macdonald

Executive Summary

  • Why household balance sheets are worse off than advertised
  • Why the recent rosy BLS jobs numbers actually mean bad news
  • How the Fed is squeezing investor capital out of other traditional asset pools and into the stock market
  • Expect to see the stock market moving higher in 2013; that is, until QE3 fails
  • What to expect if QE3 fails sooner than anticipated

If you have not yet read Part I: The Future of Gold, Oil & the Dollar, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

Market historians have recently started to point out that the current advance in the S&P500 is now 40 months old and has made gains of over 115% since the March 2009 lows. In other words, the doubling from the lows in price and the duration of the advance now late in its third year together suggest that a cyclical top is near. Furthermore, despite some noise in U.S. macro data – which has been briefly more hopeful, yet remains well within the phase of stagnation – earnings estimates have been coming down as the world economy continues to shift into lower gear.

Perhaps for the first time in a while, we can actually say that the Fed's decision to start QE3 was moderately anticipatory, in contrast to its ad-hoc and reactive policymaking over the past five years. It is not merely that the Fed soberly accepted that the economy was not getting better. The stagnant, tractionless macro data over the past year has spoken quite loudly to that fact. Indeed, the U.S. economy is merely treading water, and the Fed's move to QE3 serves as a sharp retort to those who would relentlessly attempt to portray stagnation as recovery.

by Gregor Macdonald

The Federal Reserve is probably not ready to take the aggressive plunge into Nominal GDP Targeting, but it likely will.

Such a policy, which received wider attention during Ben Bernanke's Congressional questioning last year and was also highlighted this year in a paper delivered at the Jackson Hole conference (Woodford, opens to PDF), has not caught any visible traction with Washington policy makers possibly because it’s seen as either too radical, or simply too new.

However, after four years of broad reflationary policy (and another year to come) failing to meaningfully spur U.S. employment growth, the Fed may be willing to try such measures by late next year, 2013.

The War Between Credit and Resources
by Gregor Macdonald

The Federal Reserve is probably not ready to take the aggressive plunge into Nominal GDP Targeting, but it likely will.

Such a policy, which received wider attention during Ben Bernanke's Congressional questioning last year and was also highlighted this year in a paper delivered at the Jackson Hole conference (Woodford, opens to PDF), has not caught any visible traction with Washington policy makers possibly because it’s seen as either too radical, or simply too new.

However, after four years of broad reflationary policy (and another year to come) failing to meaningfully spur U.S. employment growth, the Fed may be willing to try such measures by late next year, 2013.

by Gregor Macdonald

Executive Summary

  • Why purchasing power and quality of life will decline in OECD countries, even as economic 'growth' is maintained
  • Why 'energy mix' is as critical as 'energy supply'
  • The potential of natural gas as a "bridge" fuel
  • Why we're inheriting a "slower moving" world

If you have not yet read Part I: The War Between Credit and Resources, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

Low-Quality GDP

Declinists have been surprised by the ability of policy makers to slow the rate of our post-Peak-Oil financial collapse using quantitative easing. But the global economy stopped funding new industrial growth with oil starting seven years ago. Accordingly, the transition to coal as the source to fund growth was well underway before the financial crisis began.

And it remains vexing, to be sure, to understand how the world economy has been able to move forward – at least a little – in the post-2008 environment.

Nevertheless, we now have those answers and no longer need to forecast an imminent black swan or tail event…

What Happens Once We’ve Burned All the Resources?
PREVIEW by Gregor Macdonald

Executive Summary

  • Why purchasing power and quality of life will decline in OECD countries, even as economic 'growth' is maintained
  • Why 'energy mix' is as critical as 'energy supply'
  • The potential of natural gas as a "bridge" fuel
  • Why we're inheriting a "slower moving" world

If you have not yet read Part I: The War Between Credit and Resources, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

Low-Quality GDP

Declinists have been surprised by the ability of policy makers to slow the rate of our post-Peak-Oil financial collapse using quantitative easing. But the global economy stopped funding new industrial growth with oil starting seven years ago. Accordingly, the transition to coal as the source to fund growth was well underway before the financial crisis began.

And it remains vexing, to be sure, to understand how the world economy has been able to move forward – at least a little – in the post-2008 environment.

Nevertheless, we now have those answers and no longer need to forecast an imminent black swan or tail event…

by Gregor Macdonald

Executive Summary

  • Why pressures to the downside have less impact when the global economy is weak
  • Why oil's new floor is $80
  • The 'upside risk' story for oil prices
  • Why prices will march up to the $150-175 range over the next 2-4 years (with increasing sensitivity to spikes of over $200+ per barrel)

If you have not yet read Part I: The Repricing of Oil, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

I encourage others to read the entire recent paper on Nominal GDP (NGDP) Targeting by Michael Woodford (recently delivered at Jackson Hole) or to simply read its coverage, either by Joe Weisenthal at Business Insider or Paul Krugman at the New York Times. In short, I take the appearance of the Woodford paper (link opens to PDF) as the inevitable next-step solution to the problem of unpayable debt and scarce resources. By loudly and flagrantly voicing a policy pursuit of inflation, Nominal GDP Targeting (which has been discussed for some time in economic circles) would be the next iteration of behavioral prodding in Western economies.

More importantly, the growing acceptance of NGDP targeting in policy circles simplifies the battle that began a decade ago: the struggle to counter emerging scarcity of natural resources with the provision of greater and greater amounts of cheap credit. Within the contours of this battle lies the answer as to whether oil’s next major move is downward, in a deflationary collapse, as global demand vanishes in a new economic crisis; or whether oil’s next major move is higher, as the five billion people in the developing world pull the OECD along in a new expansion.

Modeling the next move in oil prices is, of course, a very different task than it was ten years ago…

The March to $200+ Oil
PREVIEW by Gregor Macdonald

Executive Summary

  • Why pressures to the downside have less impact when the global economy is weak
  • Why oil's new floor is $80
  • The 'upside risk' story for oil prices
  • Why prices will march up to the $150-175 range over the next 2-4 years (with increasing sensitivity to spikes of over $200+ per barrel)

If you have not yet read Part I: The Repricing of Oil, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

I encourage others to read the entire recent paper on Nominal GDP (NGDP) Targeting by Michael Woodford (recently delivered at Jackson Hole) or to simply read its coverage, either by Joe Weisenthal at Business Insider or Paul Krugman at the New York Times. In short, I take the appearance of the Woodford paper (link opens to PDF) as the inevitable next-step solution to the problem of unpayable debt and scarce resources. By loudly and flagrantly voicing a policy pursuit of inflation, Nominal GDP Targeting (which has been discussed for some time in economic circles) would be the next iteration of behavioral prodding in Western economies.

More importantly, the growing acceptance of NGDP targeting in policy circles simplifies the battle that began a decade ago: the struggle to counter emerging scarcity of natural resources with the provision of greater and greater amounts of cheap credit. Within the contours of this battle lies the answer as to whether oil’s next major move is downward, in a deflationary collapse, as global demand vanishes in a new economic crisis; or whether oil’s next major move is higher, as the five billion people in the developing world pull the OECD along in a new expansion.

Modeling the next move in oil prices is, of course, a very different task than it was ten years ago…

by Gregor Macdonald

Now that oil’s price revolution – a process that took ten years to complete – is self-evident, it is possible once again to start anew and ask: When will the next re-pricing phase begin?

Most of the structural changes that carried oil from the old equilibrium price of $25 to the new equilibrium price of $100 (average of Brent and WTIC) unfolded in the 2002-2008 period. During that time, both the difficult realities of geology and a paradigm shift in awareness worked their way into the market, as a new tranche of oil resources, entirely different in cost and structure than the old oil resources, came online. The mismatch between the old price and the emergent price was resolved incrementally at first, and finally by a super-spike in 2008.

However, once the dust settled on the ensuing global recession and financial crisis, oil then found its way to its new range between $90 and $110. Here, supply from a new set of resources and the continuance of less-elastic demand from the developing world have created moderate price stability. Prices above $90 are enough to bring on new supply, thus keeping production levels slightly flat. And yet those same prices roughly balance the continued decline of oil consumption in the OECD, which offsets the continued advance of consumption in the non-OECD.

If oil prices can’t fall that much because of the cost of marginal supply and overall flat global production, and if oil prices can’t rise that much because of restrained Western economies, what set of factors will take the oil price outside of its current envelope?

The Repricing of Oil
by Gregor Macdonald

Now that oil’s price revolution – a process that took ten years to complete – is self-evident, it is possible once again to start anew and ask: When will the next re-pricing phase begin?

Most of the structural changes that carried oil from the old equilibrium price of $25 to the new equilibrium price of $100 (average of Brent and WTIC) unfolded in the 2002-2008 period. During that time, both the difficult realities of geology and a paradigm shift in awareness worked their way into the market, as a new tranche of oil resources, entirely different in cost and structure than the old oil resources, came online. The mismatch between the old price and the emergent price was resolved incrementally at first, and finally by a super-spike in 2008.

However, once the dust settled on the ensuing global recession and financial crisis, oil then found its way to its new range between $90 and $110. Here, supply from a new set of resources and the continuance of less-elastic demand from the developing world have created moderate price stability. Prices above $90 are enough to bring on new supply, thus keeping production levels slightly flat. And yet those same prices roughly balance the continued decline of oil consumption in the OECD, which offsets the continued advance of consumption in the non-OECD.

If oil prices can’t fall that much because of the cost of marginal supply and overall flat global production, and if oil prices can’t rise that much because of restrained Western economies, what set of factors will take the oil price outside of its current envelope?

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