Economy
Executive Summary
- Why prices under $100 per barrel just aren’t cash flow positive for shale oil producers
- VIDEO: all you need to know about the shale oil industry
- Why the Boom/Bust cycle is swinging to ‘Bust’ for shale companies
- Why a prolonged ‘Bust’ in oil prices will create massive economic shockwaves
If you have not yet read Part 1: About That Shale ‘Miracle’… available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.
The Shale Reality
Now, let me build on the case that not only are shale companies not profitable at $50 per barrel oil, but they are often not profitable at prices nearly 100% higher than that.
I’m not about to make the case that all shale operators are unprofitable or about to go bust on the plays, but I am going to make the case that any sweeping statements like “technology will bring us Shale 2.0” are utterly adrift from the evidence at our disposal.
Let’s go back to September 2014, before any oil price weakness had crept into the picture. At that point in time, according the WSJ author, the shale operators should have been swimming in cash.
Well, that’s just not the case. And some of them were losing their shirts:
Sumitomo’s US shale oil foray turns sour
Sept 29, 2014
Sumitomo Corp of Japan has drawn a line under its disastrous two-year foray into shale oil in the US, with writedowns connected to the project almost completely erasing its full-year earnings.
On Monday, Sumitomo, the fourth biggest of Japan’s trading companies by market capitalisation, said that an impairment loss of Y170bn ($1.6bn) on a “tight oil” project in west Texas would form the bulk of Y240bn of charges for the fiscal year to March 2015.
(Source)
Hmmmm. I guess Sumitomo just failed to use enough smart technology or something, because otherwise how is it possible to lose $1.6 billion at a time when oil was solidly priced in the $100 range?
Sarcasm aside, the truth is that it’s all too easy to lose money in the shale plays, something I believe is already completely indicated by the negative free cash flows of the industry.
In fact, that negative free cash flow evidence tells me that…
The Hard Facts About Shale Oil
PREVIEW by Chris MartensonExecutive Summary
- Why prices under $100 per barrel just aren’t cash flow positive for shale oil producers
- VIDEO: all you need to know about the shale oil industry
- Why the Boom/Bust cycle is swinging to ‘Bust’ for shale companies
- Why a prolonged ‘Bust’ in oil prices will create massive economic shockwaves
If you have not yet read Part 1: About That Shale ‘Miracle’… available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.
The Shale Reality
Now, let me build on the case that not only are shale companies not profitable at $50 per barrel oil, but they are often not profitable at prices nearly 100% higher than that.
I’m not about to make the case that all shale operators are unprofitable or about to go bust on the plays, but I am going to make the case that any sweeping statements like “technology will bring us Shale 2.0” are utterly adrift from the evidence at our disposal.
Let’s go back to September 2014, before any oil price weakness had crept into the picture. At that point in time, according the WSJ author, the shale operators should have been swimming in cash.
Well, that’s just not the case. And some of them were losing their shirts:
Sumitomo’s US shale oil foray turns sour
Sept 29, 2014
Sumitomo Corp of Japan has drawn a line under its disastrous two-year foray into shale oil in the US, with writedowns connected to the project almost completely erasing its full-year earnings.
On Monday, Sumitomo, the fourth biggest of Japan’s trading companies by market capitalisation, said that an impairment loss of Y170bn ($1.6bn) on a “tight oil” project in west Texas would form the bulk of Y240bn of charges for the fiscal year to March 2015.
(Source)
Hmmmm. I guess Sumitomo just failed to use enough smart technology or something, because otherwise how is it possible to lose $1.6 billion at a time when oil was solidly priced in the $100 range?
Sarcasm aside, the truth is that it’s all too easy to lose money in the shale plays, something I believe is already completely indicated by the negative free cash flows of the industry.
In fact, that negative free cash flow evidence tells me that…
Executive Summary
- Why China & Russia are placing the highest priority on increasing their gold reserves
- The Asian SCO's agenda for re-defining trans-Asian money
- The looming crisis in paper currencies
- The 6 key reasons to amass paper gold today
If you have not yet read Part 1: Why Gold Is Undervalued available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.
Part 1 summarized gold’s technical position, the market position, made a value judgement against fiat dollars, described and quantified the paper market, and noted the long-term shifts of bullion into Asia. There are three big subjects left to deal with: the dynamics at the hear of the West-to-East flow of physical bullion, the scope for an accelerated deterioration in the purchasing-power of paper currencies, and the financial cold war between the advanced western economies and the Asian Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO.
Understanding The Flow Of Gold Into China & Russia
China
China’s appetite for gold has only become obvious in recent years. In reality, we do not know how much gold China has imported. We only know that for whatever reason she appears to be importing significantly larger quantities than publicly admitted. It is worth bearing in mind that this started long before the Shanghai Gold Exchange was established in 2002; the original regulations delegated total control of gold and silver to the Peoples Bank (the central bank – PBOC) in June 1983. Given at that time the west was selling gold down to the $250 level, China has most probably been secretly stockpiling gold for the last thirty years.
The 1983 regulations appear to have been introduced to take advantage of freely-available supply. Between 1983 and 2002 there was significant leasing activity by European and other central banks as well as outright sales in addition to mine output. Furthermore, the bear market from 1980-2000 led to considerable divestment of privately owned gold vaulted in Switzerland. The following table summarizes the estimated effect.
Approximately half the above-ground stocks in 2002 appears to have changed hands since 1983. The principal buyers were the Middle East until the mid-1990s and India after the Gold Control Act was rescinded. No one has suspected China of acquiring meaningful quantities of gold during this period, but the timing of the 1983 regulations suggests otherwise. India’s demand between 1990 and 2002 was only 5,426 tonnes, with perhaps 2,000 tonnes smuggled in the seven years previously, leaving 68,424 tonnes unaccounted for. And while Middle Eastern oil exporters were certainly buying in quantity it is unlikely they would have taken more than 35,000-40,000 tonnes, which leaves 28,000-33,000 tonnes unaccounted for. Conversion of bullion into jewellery for the European and North American markets could have absorbed 5,000 tonnes at most, but equally there were other sources of supply such as Russia, which was forced to sell all her gold (507 tonnes) during the financial crisis in 1998, and potentially some net selling as a result of the Tiger economies’ crisis at about the same time.
There is only one logical conclusion: China passed regulations in 1983 to acquire gold bullion. This being the case, before 2002 she could easily have secretly acquired over 20,000 tonnes. And this explains why she was then happy to let her own citizens in on the act…
The Case For Owning Physical Gold Now
PREVIEW by Alasdair MacleodExecutive Summary
- Why China & Russia are placing the highest priority on increasing their gold reserves
- The Asian SCO's agenda for re-defining trans-Asian money
- The looming crisis in paper currencies
- The 6 key reasons to amass paper gold today
If you have not yet read Part 1: Why Gold Is Undervalued available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.
Part 1 summarized gold’s technical position, the market position, made a value judgement against fiat dollars, described and quantified the paper market, and noted the long-term shifts of bullion into Asia. There are three big subjects left to deal with: the dynamics at the hear of the West-to-East flow of physical bullion, the scope for an accelerated deterioration in the purchasing-power of paper currencies, and the financial cold war between the advanced western economies and the Asian Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO.
Understanding The Flow Of Gold Into China & Russia
China
China’s appetite for gold has only become obvious in recent years. In reality, we do not know how much gold China has imported. We only know that for whatever reason she appears to be importing significantly larger quantities than publicly admitted. It is worth bearing in mind that this started long before the Shanghai Gold Exchange was established in 2002; the original regulations delegated total control of gold and silver to the Peoples Bank (the central bank – PBOC) in June 1983. Given at that time the west was selling gold down to the $250 level, China has most probably been secretly stockpiling gold for the last thirty years.
The 1983 regulations appear to have been introduced to take advantage of freely-available supply. Between 1983 and 2002 there was significant leasing activity by European and other central banks as well as outright sales in addition to mine output. Furthermore, the bear market from 1980-2000 led to considerable divestment of privately owned gold vaulted in Switzerland. The following table summarizes the estimated effect.
Approximately half the above-ground stocks in 2002 appears to have changed hands since 1983. The principal buyers were the Middle East until the mid-1990s and India after the Gold Control Act was rescinded. No one has suspected China of acquiring meaningful quantities of gold during this period, but the timing of the 1983 regulations suggests otherwise. India’s demand between 1990 and 2002 was only 5,426 tonnes, with perhaps 2,000 tonnes smuggled in the seven years previously, leaving 68,424 tonnes unaccounted for. And while Middle Eastern oil exporters were certainly buying in quantity it is unlikely they would have taken more than 35,000-40,000 tonnes, which leaves 28,000-33,000 tonnes unaccounted for. Conversion of bullion into jewellery for the European and North American markets could have absorbed 5,000 tonnes at most, but equally there were other sources of supply such as Russia, which was forced to sell all her gold (507 tonnes) during the financial crisis in 1998, and potentially some net selling as a result of the Tiger economies’ crisis at about the same time.
There is only one logical conclusion: China passed regulations in 1983 to acquire gold bullion. This being the case, before 2002 she could easily have secretly acquired over 20,000 tonnes. And this explains why she was then happy to let her own citizens in on the act…
Recently, an article by Daniel Amerman caught our attention. Titled Is There A “Back Door” Method For The Government To Pay Down The Federal Debt Using Private Savings?, it details the process known as financial repression, where sovereign debts are slowly paid off by syphoning private savings from an unaware populace.
In this week's podcast, Chris discusses the mechanics of the process, as well as its probability, with Dan.
Dan Amerman: Will Our Private Savings Be Sacrificed To Pay Down The Public Debt?
by Chris MartensonRecently, an article by Daniel Amerman caught our attention. Titled Is There A “Back Door” Method For The Government To Pay Down The Federal Debt Using Private Savings?, it details the process known as financial repression, where sovereign debts are slowly paid off by syphoning private savings from an unaware populace.
In this week's podcast, Chris discusses the mechanics of the process, as well as its probability, with Dan.
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