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If you have not yet read Part I, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

Part II: Implications of a Collapsing Japan

Back in March of 2011, when the Fukushima situation was just unfolding, one scenario that had me concerned was this one:

For decades, the world has been running its own nuclear-style reaction, only in the currency and debt markets, where exponentially-accelerating piles of debt and money have spun about faster and faster in a gigantic, complex, coordinated reaction, the core of which is, and always has been, the United States.

At the very center of this ungainly money reactor is the main fuel pile itself, the US Treasury market. With any interruption to smooth flow of money through this pile, it will immediately become unstable.

The threat I see goes like this:

Stage 1:  The world watches, riveted, as Japan suffers a tragic and horrible earthquake and tsunami, but as horrifying as these are, they are localized phenomenon affecting a relatively small percentage of the country. The real trouble lurks within damaged nuclear plants, which are now ruined and will never again produce electricity for Japan, creating instant shortages that will take years to remedy. Worse, a dangerous plume of radioactivity is carried south by winds. Tokyo partially empties and shuts down for all practical purposes.

Stage 2:  The abrupt slowdown of the world’s third largest economy alters the smooth flow of cash around the globe, and even causes reversals of some other long-standing flows. Chaotic eddies emerge in a decades-old pattern of ever-increasing flows of money into and out of the money centers, and various carry-trade and other interest-rate-sensitive strategies blow up. Manufacturing in Japan screeches to a halt, disrupting just-in-time manufacturing strategies both internally and across the globe.

Stage 3:  In order to fund the rebuilding effort, Japan has to buy a lot of items from foreign suppliers at the same time that its exports plunge precipitously. At first Japan simply does not participate in US Treasury auctions, leading to a shortage of buyers. But eventually Japan has to sell some of its vast hoard of US bonds in order to pay for external items needed for its reconstruction. Further, insurance companies, huge holders of US bonds, face stiff liability claims in the wake of the worst natural disaster to hit a heavily industrialized center and are forced to redeem enormous amounts of Treasury paper. US Treasury yields begin to climb.

Stage 4:  Continuing unrest in the MENA region serves to keep oil elevated and local funding needs high, while Europe’s weaker players (the PIIGS) continue to slip under the waves. Money continues to ebb away from the US Treasury market. Forced by circumstance, the Federal Reserve reverses its linguistic course and opens the monetary floodgates once again. There’s nothing like a crisis to justify more money printing, especially to a one-trick pony (the Fed) that only knows how to stamp its hoof on the ‘print’ button.

Stage 5:  An increasingly chaotic monetary and fiscal situation spills over into the derivatives arena, creating a number of financial accidents. Stressed governments find themselves in more of an arguing mood than a pull-together-and-sing-Kumbaya mood, and agreements are hard to come by. Banks begin to fail again, global trade falls off, unrest continues to build, and then it happens – a currency crisis.

Stage 6:  Everything changes. Faster than you think.

Obviously, Tokyo did not get evacuated as the scenario postulated, but given that the piece was penned on March 15^th and posted on March 16^th, just four days after the devastating earthquake, it was a reasonable scenario to consider (especially considering the Japanese government was considering that exact possibility at the very same time). Looking back on that scenario now, it stands up pretty well in all other regards. 

If you have not yet read Part I, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

Part II: Key Insights for Those Buying Real Estate as an Income-Generating Investment

In Part I, we looked at a variety of factors affecting the demand for housing, both resident-occupied homes and rental properties, because demand ultimately establishes valuation and price for both sales and rentals. In Part II, we address the many issues investors have to consider when they buy real estate for income generation (i.e., they become landlords or absentee owners).

As someone who has owned rental property for over 25 years, I have seen the pitfalls and the positives. As with all investments, it’s prudent to go in with eyes wide open and to ask, am I prepared if the future doesn’t unfold as anticipated?

If you have not yet read Part I, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

Part II: The Case for $2,500 Gold in 2012

In a recent New York Times editorial, Christina Romer, former chair of the Obama’s Council of Economic Advisors, essentially dismissed the view that manufacturing was a crucial component to any economy. Readers will recall my most recent essay on the boom in US exports, The Price of Growth, in which I also highlighted the skepticism of the economics establishment toward exports.

Subsequent to that essay, Annie Lowrey, the new reporter covering economic policy at the New York Times, wrote a fine overview piece that essentially echoed my own view: The US has a new industrial policy to bring back manufacturing and boost exports. The two are obviously inter-related. And it’s revealing how many mid-career professionals in America are completely oblivious to the newest thinking on the subject. Indeed, we are learning more about the crucial dynamic mentioned briefly in Part I, which is that a relationship between design and manufacturing requires a close physical proximity to flourish.

Here is Alexis Madrigal on the subject as early as 2010, in an Atlantic piece, Key Question: Can the US Innovate Without Manufacturing?

An audience member asked a simple question with deep implications: if manufacturing continues to move offshore, can the United States continue to innovate? The premise behind the question, as Splinter explained, is that manufacturing isn’t just where ideas are put into practice, but a key part of the innovation ecosystem. (He should know: he once ran Intel’s top chip fab.) It’s possible, the question suggested, that the factory itself is a site of innovation because the people closest to the work of building things know how to make them better. That view is a challenge to the simplified idea that research, product development, and manufacturing are discrete steps.

(Source)

Between you and me, I think I’ve shown that the US is only at the very start of a long road back to recovery, which will not only establish a New Normal, but will have to include exports, manufacturing, and an economy with less surplus capital. The same holds true for the other two major players in the OECD puzzle, Japan and Europe.

So what does this mean for the financial markets, and in particular, gold?

If you have not yet read Part I, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

Part II: Surviving a Currency Crisis

The Biggest Risk

The biggest risk here is not a sudden collapse of the currency that would catch everyone off guard some Tuesday afternoon in a matter of minutes. The biggest risk is in not believing that the collapse is underway. Most people are going to lose most of their wealth simply because they could not mentally and/or emotionally grasp what was actually happening.

Consider that in Greece the banks are under a tremendous run, losing up to 25% of total deposits. Sounds extreme, but let’s look at it another way: Just what are the 75% of remaining depositors thinking? How could they leave their money in a Greek bank for another minute? What are they thinking? Probably that somehow things will get better, or some other rationalization that supports their decision to hunker down and hope.

In reading When Money Dies, a historical account of the events leading up to and through the Weimar hyperinflation in Germany, one sees anecdote after anecdote of families and individuals impoverished by their own disbelief and inaction. Most just sat numbly by waiting for the currency to come back, or buying government bonds because they were asked to as a matter of patriotism, or just trusting that the government would figure something out, hoping that things would soon turn around. 

In Argentina, the same dynamic occurred. We’ve heard in detail on this site from Fernando “FerFAL” Aguirre how those who lost most were the ones who hesitated to acknowledge the reality of what was happening until it was too late.