GDP
Executive Summary
- Why pressures to the downside have less impact when the global economy is weak
- Why oil's new floor is $80
- The 'upside risk' story for oil prices
- Why prices will march up to the $150-175 range over the next 2-4 years (with increasing sensitivity to spikes of over $200+ per barrel)
If you have not yet read Part I: The Repricing of Oil, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.
I encourage others to read the entire recent paper on Nominal GDP (NGDP) Targeting by Michael Woodford (recently delivered at Jackson Hole) or to simply read its coverage, either by Joe Weisenthal at Business Insider or Paul Krugman at the New York Times. In short, I take the appearance of the Woodford paper (link opens to PDF) as the inevitable next-step solution to the problem of unpayable debt and scarce resources. By loudly and flagrantly voicing a policy pursuit of inflation, Nominal GDP Targeting (which has been discussed for some time in economic circles) would be the next iteration of behavioral prodding in Western economies.
More importantly, the growing acceptance of NGDP targeting in policy circles simplifies the battle that began a decade ago: the struggle to counter emerging scarcity of natural resources with the provision of greater and greater amounts of cheap credit. Within the contours of this battle lies the answer as to whether oil’s next major move is downward, in a deflationary collapse, as global demand vanishes in a new economic crisis; or whether oil’s next major move is higher, as the five billion people in the developing world pull the OECD along in a new expansion.
Modeling the next move in oil prices is, of course, a very different task than it was ten years ago…
The March to $200+ Oil
PREVIEW by Gregor MacdonaldExecutive Summary
- Why pressures to the downside have less impact when the global economy is weak
- Why oil's new floor is $80
- The 'upside risk' story for oil prices
- Why prices will march up to the $150-175 range over the next 2-4 years (with increasing sensitivity to spikes of over $200+ per barrel)
If you have not yet read Part I: The Repricing of Oil, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.
I encourage others to read the entire recent paper on Nominal GDP (NGDP) Targeting by Michael Woodford (recently delivered at Jackson Hole) or to simply read its coverage, either by Joe Weisenthal at Business Insider or Paul Krugman at the New York Times. In short, I take the appearance of the Woodford paper (link opens to PDF) as the inevitable next-step solution to the problem of unpayable debt and scarce resources. By loudly and flagrantly voicing a policy pursuit of inflation, Nominal GDP Targeting (which has been discussed for some time in economic circles) would be the next iteration of behavioral prodding in Western economies.
More importantly, the growing acceptance of NGDP targeting in policy circles simplifies the battle that began a decade ago: the struggle to counter emerging scarcity of natural resources with the provision of greater and greater amounts of cheap credit. Within the contours of this battle lies the answer as to whether oil’s next major move is downward, in a deflationary collapse, as global demand vanishes in a new economic crisis; or whether oil’s next major move is higher, as the five billion people in the developing world pull the OECD along in a new expansion.
Modeling the next move in oil prices is, of course, a very different task than it was ten years ago…
Executive Summary
- Escalating energy costs (direct and indirect) create a vicious cycle in the economy that further hinders growth/recovery
- Overspending and other poor capital allocation decisions by state governments are compounding the problem
- California spends $1 on public transit vs. $10 on automobile-related investment, a gap that energy costs will soon painfully reverse
- Solutions are hard to come by and harder to fund, but without investment, alternative systems won't ever achieve scale
- California's future is increasingly easy to predict; individuals and other state governments better take notes or suffer the same fate
If you have not yet read Part I: Dawn of the Great California Energy Crash, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.
A key feature in the post-war industrial success of countries like South Korea and Japan, given that they had virtually no domestic energy supplies, was the ability to turn a profit from manufacturing powered by imported energy. This favorable equation relied on three key factors:
- That imported energy remained a cheap input cost compared to the high margin value of exported goods
- That energy producing countries had cheap energy to export
- That purchasers of the exported goods were growing, and were running their own economies on cheap energy
These are the exact same assumptions still being made — and extrapolated into infinity — about California's economy.
Are we really to believe that California's GDP can forever deindustrialize, requiring fewer and fewer energy inputs, while growing in profitability, thus providing the capital to access/import energy — at any price?
California: The Bellwether for the Rest of America
PREVIEW by Gregor MacdonaldExecutive Summary
- Escalating energy costs (direct and indirect) create a vicious cycle in the economy that further hinders growth/recovery
- Overspending and other poor capital allocation decisions by state governments are compounding the problem
- California spends $1 on public transit vs. $10 on automobile-related investment, a gap that energy costs will soon painfully reverse
- Solutions are hard to come by and harder to fund, but without investment, alternative systems won't ever achieve scale
- California's future is increasingly easy to predict; individuals and other state governments better take notes or suffer the same fate
If you have not yet read Part I: Dawn of the Great California Energy Crash, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.
A key feature in the post-war industrial success of countries like South Korea and Japan, given that they had virtually no domestic energy supplies, was the ability to turn a profit from manufacturing powered by imported energy. This favorable equation relied on three key factors:
- That imported energy remained a cheap input cost compared to the high margin value of exported goods
- That energy producing countries had cheap energy to export
- That purchasers of the exported goods were growing, and were running their own economies on cheap energy
These are the exact same assumptions still being made — and extrapolated into infinity — about California's economy.
Are we really to believe that California's GDP can forever deindustrialize, requiring fewer and fewer energy inputs, while growing in profitability, thus providing the capital to access/import energy — at any price?
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