Charles Hugh Smith
Executive Summary
- Technical analysis offers methods for identifying long-term trend changes
- Introducing the Coppock Curve
- Why the Coppock Curve indicates a coming decline in the equities markets
- If correct, it may take 8-15 months to hit the bottom of the decline before a recovery begins
- Global markets are likely to all go down together, making finding "safe havens" more challenging
If you have not yet read Part I: When Will Reality Intrude and the Stock Market Hit Bottom?, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.
In Part I, we explored the correlation between the stock market and the real economy (tenuous in times of massive intervention) and the probability that the economy’s next trough lies between 10 and 30 weeks in the future. We then looked to Japan’s Nikkei stock market index as a guide to equities’ performance in eras dominated by debt and deleveraging, and found that the Nikkei’s history suggests a bottom in U.S. stocks could be as far as a year away, in mid-2013. This aligns with the possibility that the real economy hits a recessionary bottom in late 2012 and the stock market finally reflects that weakness six months later in mid-2013.
As we look at other evidence supporting a significant decline in stocks, we must keep Part I’s caveats firmly in mind:
- It’s possible that equities could rise to previous highs or even reach new highs in the near term, despite the recessionary stagnation of real incomes and growth, as stocks tend to be “lagging indicators” of recession.
- Massive monetary easing and fiscal stimulus could push “risk-on” assets (such as stocks) higher, even as the real economy weakens.
- Global Corporate America could continue generating profits that would support stock market valuations even as the bottom 80% of U.S. households sees further deterioration in their real incomes and balance sheets.
These three factors could support a decoupling of the stock market from the “main street” economy as measured by real (inflation adjusted) incomes and household balance sheets.
Predicting the ‘When?’ & ‘How Far?’ of the Next Market Decline
PREVIEW by charleshughsmithExecutive Summary
- Technical analysis offers methods for identifying long-term trend changes
- Introducing the Coppock Curve
- Why the Coppock Curve indicates a coming decline in the equities markets
- If correct, it may take 8-15 months to hit the bottom of the decline before a recovery begins
- Global markets are likely to all go down together, making finding "safe havens" more challenging
If you have not yet read Part I: When Will Reality Intrude and the Stock Market Hit Bottom?, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.
In Part I, we explored the correlation between the stock market and the real economy (tenuous in times of massive intervention) and the probability that the economy’s next trough lies between 10 and 30 weeks in the future. We then looked to Japan’s Nikkei stock market index as a guide to equities’ performance in eras dominated by debt and deleveraging, and found that the Nikkei’s history suggests a bottom in U.S. stocks could be as far as a year away, in mid-2013. This aligns with the possibility that the real economy hits a recessionary bottom in late 2012 and the stock market finally reflects that weakness six months later in mid-2013.
As we look at other evidence supporting a significant decline in stocks, we must keep Part I’s caveats firmly in mind:
- It’s possible that equities could rise to previous highs or even reach new highs in the near term, despite the recessionary stagnation of real incomes and growth, as stocks tend to be “lagging indicators” of recession.
- Massive monetary easing and fiscal stimulus could push “risk-on” assets (such as stocks) higher, even as the real economy weakens.
- Global Corporate America could continue generating profits that would support stock market valuations even as the bottom 80% of U.S. households sees further deterioration in their real incomes and balance sheets.
These three factors could support a decoupling of the stock market from the “main street” economy as measured by real (inflation adjusted) incomes and household balance sheets.
Executive Summary
- How much have households, corporations, and the government combined deleveraged since 2008? (Barely at all.)
- Have our national debt-to-income ratios improved since 2008? (No, they've gotten worse.)
- Increasingly, unlevered assets will be sold to maintain the phantom value of levered assets.
- Ultimately, levered losses will need to be taken. Cash and cash equivalents will be in high demand as this happens.
Part I: The Pernicious Dynamics of Debt, Deleveraging, and Deflation
If you have not yet read Part I, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.
Part II: The Deleveraging Pain Is Just Beginning
In Part I, we sought an understanding of the causal linkages between debt, deleveraging, and deflation. In Part II, we analyze the key data and charts to get a better understanding of how far deleveraging has to go.
The basic idea in deleveraging is that debt exceeds the value of the underlying asset—for example, a mortgage exceeds the value of the home. The difference must be made up with savings from income or from the sale of other assets, or the asset must be sold and the loss booked.
In the case of consumer and government debt, the underlying assets are, in effect, future income and future tax revenues. The student has no assets to sell to pay off a student loan; the loan was leveraged off future income. The same is true of government bonds. Though consumers often maintain that the goods they bought on credit have retained value, in many cases the market value of items bought on credit is far below the debt still to be paid.
The situation is thus dire for loans without underlying assets that can be sold. Cash to service these loans must be raised by selling other assets or by diverting income.
I see the forces of debt, deleveraging, deflation, and inflation (money-printing) as positive (self-reinforcing) and negative (countervailing) feedback loops; the interactions are complex and can oscillate in dynamic equilibrium until a crisis pushes the system firmly into disequilibrium.
The Deleveraging Pain Is Just Beginning
PREVIEW by charleshughsmithExecutive Summary
- How much have households, corporations, and the government combined deleveraged since 2008? (Barely at all.)
- Have our national debt-to-income ratios improved since 2008? (No, they've gotten worse.)
- Increasingly, unlevered assets will be sold to maintain the phantom value of levered assets.
- Ultimately, levered losses will need to be taken. Cash and cash equivalents will be in high demand as this happens.
Part I: The Pernicious Dynamics of Debt, Deleveraging, and Deflation
If you have not yet read Part I, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.
Part II: The Deleveraging Pain Is Just Beginning
In Part I, we sought an understanding of the causal linkages between debt, deleveraging, and deflation. In Part II, we analyze the key data and charts to get a better understanding of how far deleveraging has to go.
The basic idea in deleveraging is that debt exceeds the value of the underlying asset—for example, a mortgage exceeds the value of the home. The difference must be made up with savings from income or from the sale of other assets, or the asset must be sold and the loss booked.
In the case of consumer and government debt, the underlying assets are, in effect, future income and future tax revenues. The student has no assets to sell to pay off a student loan; the loan was leveraged off future income. The same is true of government bonds. Though consumers often maintain that the goods they bought on credit have retained value, in many cases the market value of items bought on credit is far below the debt still to be paid.
The situation is thus dire for loans without underlying assets that can be sold. Cash to service these loans must be raised by selling other assets or by diverting income.
I see the forces of debt, deleveraging, deflation, and inflation (money-printing) as positive (self-reinforcing) and negative (countervailing) feedback loops; the interactions are complex and can oscillate in dynamic equilibrium until a crisis pushes the system firmly into disequilibrium.
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