Energy

If you have not yet read Part I, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

Part II – How To Position For the Next Great Oil Squeeze

Using the latest data from EIA Washington, I made the following chart of actual imports of crude oil against production. This is a simple and direct accounting of what can become a rather complex topic filled with obfuscation and bad math. For example, by counting biofuels, ethanol, natural gas liquids, and the use of our own natural gas inputs to refine crude oil into gasoline, you can produce rather misleading accounts of net imports, such as this piece from EIA Washington titled How Dependent Are We on Foreign Oil?

Just so that we are very clear on the facts, natural gas liquids (NGLs) contain only 65% of the btu of oil, and, of course, they are not oil. As Jeff Rubin likes to say, “NGLs can go straight to your butane cigarette lighter, not your automobile.” But by adding NGLs and ethanol to “oil supply,” we can delude ourselves into thinking that the US produces not 5.596 mbpd of crude oil, but rather 10.037 mbpd of liquids.

Despite any legitimate conversation we could have about the usefulness of various energy resources, it would be silly to say (for example) that “we need not worry about expensive oil and its effect on the economy, because we can just switch to ethanol.” The vastly smaller btu content of biofuel feedstock makes its inclusion in the accounting unhelpful, to say the least. As one Oil Drum commenter said to my previously cited post:

If the goal is to highlight the decline of crude oil production over time then including all other fuel sources is improper. You can’t project a future production trend of one commodity by including other commodities in the analysis.

(Source)

Yes, precisely. To that point, let’s now look at the chart.

If you have not yet read Part I, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

Part II: How To Position For The Next Oil Shock

Putting It All Together

Let’s review the situation in the KSA:

1. Despite assurances of 12.5 mbd of total capacity, the KSA has not yet produced more than 9 mbd on a sustained basis in 2011.
2. The IEA is begging the KSA to pump more.
3. The KSA has turned to outside companies to help it begin to unlock heavy oil reserves that will take a lot of time, energy, and money to prosecute.
4. The KSA has a vastly expanded rig count as they expand drilling operations to produce more oil (odd behavior for a nation with an alleged 3.5 mbd of spare capacity?).

The simplest and therefore most likely explanation for all of this is that the KSA does not actually have 12.5 mbd of total capacity, it is already at peak, and it’s now struggling to maintain even 9 mbd of total output on a limited basis.

Of course, there are other possibilities, but since those will not shake the world to its bones if they happen to be true, the safe course of action here is to go with the ‘KSA is at peak’ story.  Sooner or later it will be true, so there’s not a lot of harm in being early to it, while being late could be costly.

Now let’s move onto the last part of this puzzle: demand.