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by charleshughsmith

Executive Summary

  • Technical analysis offers methods for identifying long-term trend changes
  • Introducing the Coppock Curve
  • Why the Coppock Curve indicates a coming decline in the equities markets
  • If correct, it may take 8-15 months to hit the bottom of the decline before a recovery begins
  • Global markets are likely to all go down together, making finding "safe havens" more challenging

If you have not yet read Part I: When Will Reality Intrude and the Stock Market Hit Bottom?, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

In Part I, we explored the correlation between the stock market and the real economy (tenuous in times of massive intervention) and the probability that the economy’s next trough lies between 10 and 30 weeks in the future.  We then looked to Japan’s Nikkei stock market index as a guide to equities’ performance in eras dominated by debt and deleveraging, and found that the Nikkei’s history suggests a bottom in U.S. stocks could be as far as a year away, in mid-2013.  This aligns with the possibility that the real economy hits a recessionary bottom in late 2012 and the stock market finally reflects that weakness six months later in mid-2013.

As we look at other evidence supporting a significant decline in stocks, we must keep Part I’s caveats firmly in mind:

  1. It’s possible that equities could rise to previous highs or even reach new highs in the near term, despite the recessionary stagnation of real incomes and growth, as stocks tend to be “lagging indicators” of recession.
  2. Massive monetary easing and fiscal stimulus could push “risk-on” assets (such as stocks) higher, even as the real economy weakens.
  3. Global Corporate America could continue generating profits that would support stock market valuations even as the bottom 80% of U.S. households sees further deterioration in their real incomes and balance sheets.

These three factors could support a decoupling of the stock market from the “main street” economy as measured by real (inflation adjusted) incomes and household balance sheets.

Predicting the ‘When?’ & ‘How Far?’ of the Next Market Decline
PREVIEW by charleshughsmith

Executive Summary

  • Technical analysis offers methods for identifying long-term trend changes
  • Introducing the Coppock Curve
  • Why the Coppock Curve indicates a coming decline in the equities markets
  • If correct, it may take 8-15 months to hit the bottom of the decline before a recovery begins
  • Global markets are likely to all go down together, making finding "safe havens" more challenging

If you have not yet read Part I: When Will Reality Intrude and the Stock Market Hit Bottom?, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

In Part I, we explored the correlation between the stock market and the real economy (tenuous in times of massive intervention) and the probability that the economy’s next trough lies between 10 and 30 weeks in the future.  We then looked to Japan’s Nikkei stock market index as a guide to equities’ performance in eras dominated by debt and deleveraging, and found that the Nikkei’s history suggests a bottom in U.S. stocks could be as far as a year away, in mid-2013.  This aligns with the possibility that the real economy hits a recessionary bottom in late 2012 and the stock market finally reflects that weakness six months later in mid-2013.

As we look at other evidence supporting a significant decline in stocks, we must keep Part I’s caveats firmly in mind:

  1. It’s possible that equities could rise to previous highs or even reach new highs in the near term, despite the recessionary stagnation of real incomes and growth, as stocks tend to be “lagging indicators” of recession.
  2. Massive monetary easing and fiscal stimulus could push “risk-on” assets (such as stocks) higher, even as the real economy weakens.
  3. Global Corporate America could continue generating profits that would support stock market valuations even as the bottom 80% of U.S. households sees further deterioration in their real incomes and balance sheets.

These three factors could support a decoupling of the stock market from the “main street” economy as measured by real (inflation adjusted) incomes and household balance sheets.

by Chris Martenson

After Alice fell down the rabbit hole, nothing made sense anymore. A new logic reigned, and she had to adapt to it as readily as she could. Talking cats that disappeared except for their grin, caterpillars perched on magic mushrooms, and other oddities had to be encountered and dealt with.

Similarly, we find ourselves suddenly confronted with a fantastical menagerie. Such as the formerly inconsequential Greek interparty political wrestling matches becoming of critical importance to the fate of the entire world banking system, stock markets mainly discounting the likelihood and size of the next round of magic money-printing, a world that has decided Spain’s 6% deficit matters a lot while the US’s 8% deficit doesn’t matter at all, untrustworthy institutions that just abscond with client money without charge, and stock markets that are now mostly in the hands of robot machines trading in sub-millisecond cycles.

The signs of distress are obvious. The old forms of logic no longer work and the new logic cannot be traded reliably, as it owes its direction to pulses of fresh money and gyrating sentiment. All asset classes trade in lockstep, with nowhere to run and nowhere to hide. It’s either risk on or risk off, and knowing which might prevail at any given moment is now a 24/7 occupation, and a risky one at that.

The entire stock market is now simply living off of expectations of the future quantitative easing (QE) efforts, with another decision or announcement expected tomorrow at 2:15 EST.

This is the world we live in now, and hardly anybody even questions it anymore.

“More Stress Is Needed”
PREVIEW by Chris Martenson

After Alice fell down the rabbit hole, nothing made sense anymore. A new logic reigned, and she had to adapt to it as readily as she could. Talking cats that disappeared except for their grin, caterpillars perched on magic mushrooms, and other oddities had to be encountered and dealt with.

Similarly, we find ourselves suddenly confronted with a fantastical menagerie. Such as the formerly inconsequential Greek interparty political wrestling matches becoming of critical importance to the fate of the entire world banking system, stock markets mainly discounting the likelihood and size of the next round of magic money-printing, a world that has decided Spain’s 6% deficit matters a lot while the US’s 8% deficit doesn’t matter at all, untrustworthy institutions that just abscond with client money without charge, and stock markets that are now mostly in the hands of robot machines trading in sub-millisecond cycles.

The signs of distress are obvious. The old forms of logic no longer work and the new logic cannot be traded reliably, as it owes its direction to pulses of fresh money and gyrating sentiment. All asset classes trade in lockstep, with nowhere to run and nowhere to hide. It’s either risk on or risk off, and knowing which might prevail at any given moment is now a 24/7 occupation, and a risky one at that.

The entire stock market is now simply living off of expectations of the future quantitative easing (QE) efforts, with another decision or announcement expected tomorrow at 2:15 EST.

This is the world we live in now, and hardly anybody even questions it anymore.

by Alasdair Macleod

Executive Summary

  • Why Greece is unlikely to release a new drachma
  • Why globally-coordinated money printing is the most likely resolution to the Greek & Spanish crises
  • Why the magnitude of derivative risk makes a Eurozone collapse much more frightening
  • Why capital flight will get worse, and why gold will benefit from this
  • Why Germany's odds for leaving the Eurozone are lower than most assume
  • Why the time left before extreme action must be taken is than a few months – possibly only weeks

 

If you have not yet read Part I: Abandoning Ship, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

 

Here are some key points to bear in mind as the crisis progresses:

Greece: new drachma?

The Greeks would be crazy to embrace a new drachma, as recommended by neoclassical economists. A new drachma would be backed by nothing, unless it comes with full convertibility into Greece’s 111.6 tonnes of gold, assuming that actually exists. The complete lack of faith in any Greek government’s economic credentials would mean a new drachma in the absence of gold convertibility would rapidly descend towards its intrinsic value, which is zero. Interestingly, recent polls suggest that the Greek people understand this and prefer to remain with the euro.

The legality of changing deposits from euros to drachmas is highly questionable. Assuming the Greek government can force this through on domestic deposits that will leave an open question over loans, likely to be challenged through the courts. And in the past non-Greek banks lending money to Greek businesses have as a matter of course stipulated contracts to be governed by the laws of another jurisdiction.

Message: do not buy into the siren attractions of an independent drachma…

The Most Predictable Next Events
PREVIEW by Alasdair Macleod

Executive Summary

  • Why Greece is unlikely to release a new drachma
  • Why globally-coordinated money printing is the most likely resolution to the Greek & Spanish crises
  • Why the magnitude of derivative risk makes a Eurozone collapse much more frightening
  • Why capital flight will get worse, and why gold will benefit from this
  • Why Germany's odds for leaving the Eurozone are lower than most assume
  • Why the time left before extreme action must be taken is than a few months – possibly only weeks

 

If you have not yet read Part I: Abandoning Ship, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

 

Here are some key points to bear in mind as the crisis progresses:

Greece: new drachma?

The Greeks would be crazy to embrace a new drachma, as recommended by neoclassical economists. A new drachma would be backed by nothing, unless it comes with full convertibility into Greece’s 111.6 tonnes of gold, assuming that actually exists. The complete lack of faith in any Greek government’s economic credentials would mean a new drachma in the absence of gold convertibility would rapidly descend towards its intrinsic value, which is zero. Interestingly, recent polls suggest that the Greek people understand this and prefer to remain with the euro.

The legality of changing deposits from euros to drachmas is highly questionable. Assuming the Greek government can force this through on domestic deposits that will leave an open question over loans, likely to be challenged through the courts. And in the past non-Greek banks lending money to Greek businesses have as a matter of course stipulated contracts to be governed by the laws of another jurisdiction.

Message: do not buy into the siren attractions of an independent drachma…

by charleshughsmith

Executive Summary

  • How much have households, corporations, and the government combined deleveraged since 2008? (Barely at all.)
  • Have our national debt-to-income ratios improved since 2008? (No, they've gotten worse.)
  • Increasingly, unlevered assets will be sold to maintain the phantom value of levered assets.
  • Ultimately, levered losses will need to be taken. Cash and cash equivalents will be in high demand as this happens.

Part I: The Pernicious Dynamics of Debt, Deleveraging, and Deflation

If you have not yet read Part I, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

Part II: The Deleveraging Pain Is Just Beginning

In Part I, we sought an understanding of the causal linkages between debt, deleveraging, and deflation. In Part II, we analyze the key data and charts to get a better understanding of how far deleveraging has to go.

The basic idea in deleveraging is that debt exceeds the value of the underlying asset—for example, a mortgage exceeds the value of the home. The difference must be made up with savings from income or from the sale of other assets, or the asset must be sold and the loss booked.

In the case of consumer and government debt, the underlying assets are, in effect, future income and future tax revenues. The student has no assets to sell to pay off a student loan; the loan was leveraged off future income. The same is true of government bonds.  Though consumers often maintain that the goods they bought on credit have retained value, in many cases the market value of items bought on credit is far below the debt still to be paid.

The situation is thus dire for loans without underlying assets that can be sold. Cash to service these loans must be raised by selling other assets or by diverting income.

I see the forces of debt, deleveraging, deflation, and inflation (money-printing) as positive (self-reinforcing) and negative (countervailing) feedback loops; the interactions are complex and can oscillate in dynamic equilibrium until a crisis pushes the system firmly into disequilibrium.

The Deleveraging Pain Is Just Beginning
PREVIEW by charleshughsmith

Executive Summary

  • How much have households, corporations, and the government combined deleveraged since 2008? (Barely at all.)
  • Have our national debt-to-income ratios improved since 2008? (No, they've gotten worse.)
  • Increasingly, unlevered assets will be sold to maintain the phantom value of levered assets.
  • Ultimately, levered losses will need to be taken. Cash and cash equivalents will be in high demand as this happens.

Part I: The Pernicious Dynamics of Debt, Deleveraging, and Deflation

If you have not yet read Part I, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

Part II: The Deleveraging Pain Is Just Beginning

In Part I, we sought an understanding of the causal linkages between debt, deleveraging, and deflation. In Part II, we analyze the key data and charts to get a better understanding of how far deleveraging has to go.

The basic idea in deleveraging is that debt exceeds the value of the underlying asset—for example, a mortgage exceeds the value of the home. The difference must be made up with savings from income or from the sale of other assets, or the asset must be sold and the loss booked.

In the case of consumer and government debt, the underlying assets are, in effect, future income and future tax revenues. The student has no assets to sell to pay off a student loan; the loan was leveraged off future income. The same is true of government bonds.  Though consumers often maintain that the goods they bought on credit have retained value, in many cases the market value of items bought on credit is far below the debt still to be paid.

The situation is thus dire for loans without underlying assets that can be sold. Cash to service these loans must be raised by selling other assets or by diverting income.

I see the forces of debt, deleveraging, deflation, and inflation (money-printing) as positive (self-reinforcing) and negative (countervailing) feedback loops; the interactions are complex and can oscillate in dynamic equilibrium until a crisis pushes the system firmly into disequilibrium.

by Gregor Macdonald

Executive Summary

  • Why oil price vulnerability is growing 
  • Why the marginal cost of oil is rising higher at an accelerating rate
  • Why the marginal cost of oil for non-OPEC regions is now above $90
  • The hard math explaining why an increase an output from OPEC will no longer reduce the world price for oil
  • The new rules that will govern the price of oil from here
  • The alarming growing risk of large-scale war for oil

Part I: OPEC Has Lost the Power to Lower the Price of Oil

If you have not yet read Part I, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

Part II: The Cruel Math of the Marginal Barrel

An unpleasant megatrend that has affected global oil production the past decade has been the quickly escalating cost of production. However, prices have finally risen high enough to stabilize declines in regions like North America.

This actually makes for a new and emerging vulnerability: the risk that prices fall at some point through levels that remove the new oil supply.

Given that world oil production has been trapped below 74 mbpd since 2005, and that the cost of the marginal barrel keeps rising, this vulnerability is growing.

The Cruel Math of the Marginal Barrel
PREVIEW by Gregor Macdonald

Executive Summary

  • Why oil price vulnerability is growing 
  • Why the marginal cost of oil is rising higher at an accelerating rate
  • Why the marginal cost of oil for non-OPEC regions is now above $90
  • The hard math explaining why an increase an output from OPEC will no longer reduce the world price for oil
  • The new rules that will govern the price of oil from here
  • The alarming growing risk of large-scale war for oil

Part I: OPEC Has Lost the Power to Lower the Price of Oil

If you have not yet read Part I, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

Part II: The Cruel Math of the Marginal Barrel

An unpleasant megatrend that has affected global oil production the past decade has been the quickly escalating cost of production. However, prices have finally risen high enough to stabilize declines in regions like North America.

This actually makes for a new and emerging vulnerability: the risk that prices fall at some point through levels that remove the new oil supply.

Given that world oil production has been trapped below 74 mbpd since 2005, and that the cost of the marginal barrel keeps rising, this vulnerability is growing.

Total 1184 items