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by Chris Martenson

Executive Summary

  • What Detroit tells us about continuing the status quo
  • The shocking true size of the real U.S. debt
  • Why time is our most valuable but scarcest asset
  • Where your efforts need to be placed to address the big picture

If you have not yet read Part I: Why We All Lose If the Fed Wins, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

If we can't even have an honest conversation six years into this failed experiment about its core aspects, then it is little wonder that there's virtually no appetite for the bigger burning questions of our time, such as where do we want to be in twenty years and what do we need to do to get there?

Instead, the focus is simply on preserving the status quo and doing everything possible to maintain it. Never mind that the status quo is obviously failing in many key regards and needs some serious adjustments.  All that the Fed and D.C. have in mind here is more of the same.

And this is why we will lose the war.

The Detroit Harbinger

If we want to know what happens when we ignore reality and just soldier on, we need look no further than Detroit to see how that works out. For years, that city mismanaged its finances, continually banking on the idea that eventually jobs and opportunity would return. They continued to offer yet failed to fund lavish pension promises to municipal employees, even though anybody with a pocket calculator could work out that the plans were not viable.

But the plans were offered, and the union reps on the other side of the table accepted the terms, even though at some point it would have made sense for someone to raise the obvious by noting that the plans were utterly insolvent and almost certain to stay that way.

Right now, the pensions in Detroit are underfunded by $3.5 billion, according to official figures.  But those same officials are assuming an 8% rate of return on current pension assets, a rate that nobody is actually achieving in the pension world thanks, in large part, to Bernanke's 0% interest rate policy.

Here's how they got to this point:

The Real Story to Focus On
PREVIEW by Chris Martenson

Executive Summary

  • What Detroit tells us about continuing the status quo
  • The shocking true size of the real U.S. debt
  • Why time is our most valuable but scarcest asset
  • Where your efforts need to be placed to address the big picture

If you have not yet read Part I: Why We All Lose If the Fed Wins, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

If we can't even have an honest conversation six years into this failed experiment about its core aspects, then it is little wonder that there's virtually no appetite for the bigger burning questions of our time, such as where do we want to be in twenty years and what do we need to do to get there?

Instead, the focus is simply on preserving the status quo and doing everything possible to maintain it. Never mind that the status quo is obviously failing in many key regards and needs some serious adjustments.  All that the Fed and D.C. have in mind here is more of the same.

And this is why we will lose the war.

The Detroit Harbinger

If we want to know what happens when we ignore reality and just soldier on, we need look no further than Detroit to see how that works out. For years, that city mismanaged its finances, continually banking on the idea that eventually jobs and opportunity would return. They continued to offer yet failed to fund lavish pension promises to municipal employees, even though anybody with a pocket calculator could work out that the plans were not viable.

But the plans were offered, and the union reps on the other side of the table accepted the terms, even though at some point it would have made sense for someone to raise the obvious by noting that the plans were utterly insolvent and almost certain to stay that way.

Right now, the pensions in Detroit are underfunded by $3.5 billion, according to official figures.  But those same officials are assuming an 8% rate of return on current pension assets, a rate that nobody is actually achieving in the pension world thanks, in large part, to Bernanke's 0% interest rate policy.

Here's how they got to this point:

by charleshughsmith

Executive Summary

  • Understanding the Fed's ability to impact (or not) health & education, pensions, and inflation
  • What you can do to insulate yourself from the impacts of the Fed's financial interference
    • Mindset
    • Major expenses
    • Debt
    • Resilience
    • Income

If you have not yet read Part I: The Fed Matters Much Less Than You Think, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

In Part I, we found that the supposedly omniscient Federal Reserve is irrelevant to the engine of real wealth creation (innovation) and actively inhibits the allocation of capital and labor to innovation by incentivizing speculation and malinvestment.

In Part II, we’ll look at what else matters that the Fed either negatively influences or does not control, as well as specific actions we can take as individuals to insulate ourselves from the collateral damage caused by misguided central bank policies.

Health and Education

We all know health and education are vital to individuals and the economy, and like everything else that matters, the Fed’s influence is limited to financial repression of interest rates that enables the Federal government to avoid the sort of healthy fiscal discipline that higher rates would demand. In other words, the Fed has widened the moat around government spending, protecting it from the hard choices that would accompany massive deficits and bond issuance in a free-market economy.

Public and Private Pensions

By at least one measure, the Fed’s repression of interest rates (designed to recapitalize the banks at no direct cost to the Fed or government) has cost savers $10.8 trillion in lost income. Since the majority of savings in the U.S. are in public and private pension plans, 401Ks, and IRAs (individual retirement accounts), the Fed’s repression of interest rates has pushed these income-security savings into risky speculative asset bubbles in stocks, bonds, and real estate, and critically undermined the financial health of pensions by radically reducing their low-risk, safe returns.

How You Can Limit Your Exposure to the Fed’s Financial Interference
PREVIEW by charleshughsmith

Executive Summary

  • Understanding the Fed's ability to impact (or not) health & education, pensions, and inflation
  • What you can do to insulate yourself from the impacts of the Fed's financial interference
    • Mindset
    • Major expenses
    • Debt
    • Resilience
    • Income

If you have not yet read Part I: The Fed Matters Much Less Than You Think, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

In Part I, we found that the supposedly omniscient Federal Reserve is irrelevant to the engine of real wealth creation (innovation) and actively inhibits the allocation of capital and labor to innovation by incentivizing speculation and malinvestment.

In Part II, we’ll look at what else matters that the Fed either negatively influences or does not control, as well as specific actions we can take as individuals to insulate ourselves from the collateral damage caused by misguided central bank policies.

Health and Education

We all know health and education are vital to individuals and the economy, and like everything else that matters, the Fed’s influence is limited to financial repression of interest rates that enables the Federal government to avoid the sort of healthy fiscal discipline that higher rates would demand. In other words, the Fed has widened the moat around government spending, protecting it from the hard choices that would accompany massive deficits and bond issuance in a free-market economy.

Public and Private Pensions

By at least one measure, the Fed’s repression of interest rates (designed to recapitalize the banks at no direct cost to the Fed or government) has cost savers $10.8 trillion in lost income. Since the majority of savings in the U.S. are in public and private pension plans, 401Ks, and IRAs (individual retirement accounts), the Fed’s repression of interest rates has pushed these income-security savings into risky speculative asset bubbles in stocks, bonds, and real estate, and critically undermined the financial health of pensions by radically reducing their low-risk, safe returns.

by JHK

Executive Summary

  • The end of plentiful resources will challenge many deeply held social beliefs
  • Downscaling and re-localization will be the dominant economic trends
  • What this will mean for “work”
  • What this will mean for lifestyles
  • What this will mean for social relationships

If you have not yet read Part I: Class, Race, Hierarchy, and Social Relations in The Long Emergency, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

I’d also argue that the recent historical saeculum — the climax decades of turbo-industrialism post World War Two — produced extremely anomalous social and economic conditions that have torqued our expectations in highly unrealistic directions. Chief among these was the assumption that the economic equations of the late 20th century would persist indefinitely; that there would always be more of everything, including cheap fossil fuels and monetary credit to support our activities. Now, as we encounter the onrushing reality of no-longer-cheap energy, our expectations for technological rescue become ever more detached from reality. On the money side of things, we vainly try to offset the impairments of capital formation with pervasive accounting fraud, asset price manipulation, and market interventions, all of which only worsen the impairments of capital formation. In short, the principal arrangements of modern economies are headed for an inflection point, probably sooner rather than later, where we can expect critical systems to founder — banking, agriculture, trade, transportation — and thus for social conditions to enter a flux of change as well.

The economic abnormalities of climax turbo-industrial life also produced a range of ideological distortions around questions of social organization, in particular the conflation of technological progress with expanding social equality. The idea was defective in more than one way, but certainly in the sense that technological progress itself was assumed to be limitless. The 20th century cavalcade of wonders — movies, airplanes, radio, atom bombs, heart transplants, computers, etc. — had programmed the public to expect nothing less. This hubristic techno-narcissism was most conspicuous among the techies themselves. No one could imagine the possibility of a time-out from progress, let alone an end of technological dazzle. The idea of ever-greater social leveling was also at odds with the human predilection for status-seeking. And, in fact, technology became both a signifier and an enabler of social status in the computer age for the billionaires who developed it and the young people who used iPhones and Facebook minute-by-minute to jockey for status enhancement. All the while, in the background, peak cheap oil was provoking a concentration of financial wealth in the shenanigans around capital, so the basic gulf between the haves and have-nots only grew deeper and wider…

The New Disposition of Things
PREVIEW by JHK

Executive Summary

  • The end of plentiful resources will challenge many deeply held social beliefs
  • Downscaling and re-localization will be the dominant economic trends
  • What this will mean for “work”
  • What this will mean for lifestyles
  • What this will mean for social relationships

If you have not yet read Part I: Class, Race, Hierarchy, and Social Relations in The Long Emergency, available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

I’d also argue that the recent historical saeculum — the climax decades of turbo-industrialism post World War Two — produced extremely anomalous social and economic conditions that have torqued our expectations in highly unrealistic directions. Chief among these was the assumption that the economic equations of the late 20th century would persist indefinitely; that there would always be more of everything, including cheap fossil fuels and monetary credit to support our activities. Now, as we encounter the onrushing reality of no-longer-cheap energy, our expectations for technological rescue become ever more detached from reality. On the money side of things, we vainly try to offset the impairments of capital formation with pervasive accounting fraud, asset price manipulation, and market interventions, all of which only worsen the impairments of capital formation. In short, the principal arrangements of modern economies are headed for an inflection point, probably sooner rather than later, where we can expect critical systems to founder — banking, agriculture, trade, transportation — and thus for social conditions to enter a flux of change as well.

The economic abnormalities of climax turbo-industrial life also produced a range of ideological distortions around questions of social organization, in particular the conflation of technological progress with expanding social equality. The idea was defective in more than one way, but certainly in the sense that technological progress itself was assumed to be limitless. The 20th century cavalcade of wonders — movies, airplanes, radio, atom bombs, heart transplants, computers, etc. — had programmed the public to expect nothing less. This hubristic techno-narcissism was most conspicuous among the techies themselves. No one could imagine the possibility of a time-out from progress, let alone an end of technological dazzle. The idea of ever-greater social leveling was also at odds with the human predilection for status-seeking. And, in fact, technology became both a signifier and an enabler of social status in the computer age for the billionaires who developed it and the young people who used iPhones and Facebook minute-by-minute to jockey for status enhancement. All the while, in the background, peak cheap oil was provoking a concentration of financial wealth in the shenanigans around capital, so the basic gulf between the haves and have-nots only grew deeper and wider…

by charleshughsmith

Executive Summary

  • The commodity complex is already beginning to rise following oil's upside breakout
  • Natural gas is trending higher
  • Copper appears to have bottomed
  • Wheat and coffee's downtrends are ending
  • A secular rise in commodities can happen even in the face of slower economic growth and lower demand

If you have not yet read Part I: Get Ready for Rising Commodity Prices available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

In Part I, we examined the conventional narratives used to explain the price of oil and found that they no longer account for oil’s breakout to a new uptrend.  I suggested that financialization and speculation could power oil much higher, despite sagging global demand for physical oil and a potentially deflationary global recession.

This thesis has been met with widespread skepticism when I’ve aired it privately, and I think this skepticism arises from the newness of this narrative. In the past, oil has responded to supply-demand and inflation/deflation. The notion that oil could rise in a finance-induced “scarcity amidst plenty” is neither simple nor intuitive.

If oil tracks higher, we can anticipate that the primary commodities (energy, agricultural, and construction) may well rise, even as end-user demand weakens, as oil underpins all production and transport. The 2.5% rise in producer prices over the past year suggests this is already occurring.

The secondary reason is that lower prices eventually push marginal producers out of business, tightening supply and giving the remaining producers pricing power.

As noted in Part I, regardless of what we see as key drivers or what we think oil “should do,” oil has broken out technically.

Is there any evidence to support the idea that the uptrend in oil will trigger higher prices in other commodities? Let’s start with the CRB (Commodity Research Bureau) index that reflects a basket of commodities…

Understanding the Secular Shift of Capital into Commodities
PREVIEW by charleshughsmith

Executive Summary

  • The commodity complex is already beginning to rise following oil's upside breakout
  • Natural gas is trending higher
  • Copper appears to have bottomed
  • Wheat and coffee's downtrends are ending
  • A secular rise in commodities can happen even in the face of slower economic growth and lower demand

If you have not yet read Part I: Get Ready for Rising Commodity Prices available free to all readers, please click here to read it first.

In Part I, we examined the conventional narratives used to explain the price of oil and found that they no longer account for oil’s breakout to a new uptrend.  I suggested that financialization and speculation could power oil much higher, despite sagging global demand for physical oil and a potentially deflationary global recession.

This thesis has been met with widespread skepticism when I’ve aired it privately, and I think this skepticism arises from the newness of this narrative. In the past, oil has responded to supply-demand and inflation/deflation. The notion that oil could rise in a finance-induced “scarcity amidst plenty” is neither simple nor intuitive.

If oil tracks higher, we can anticipate that the primary commodities (energy, agricultural, and construction) may well rise, even as end-user demand weakens, as oil underpins all production and transport. The 2.5% rise in producer prices over the past year suggests this is already occurring.

The secondary reason is that lower prices eventually push marginal producers out of business, tightening supply and giving the remaining producers pricing power.

As noted in Part I, regardless of what we see as key drivers or what we think oil “should do,” oil has broken out technically.

Is there any evidence to support the idea that the uptrend in oil will trigger higher prices in other commodities? Let’s start with the CRB (Commodity Research Bureau) index that reflects a basket of commodities…

Total 1184 items